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Abstract
Migration as an important social factor has been recently considered in evolutionary
games on graphs. However, the migration-related cost is largely ignored in previous
works, which may indeed influence individual migration decision in human society.
Here we propose a model of the success-driven migration with migration costs where
individuals decide whether to migrate or not according to the migration cost and
expected payoff. We consider two different calculation schemes for the migration
cost, i.e., distance-dependent and distance-independent costs, and study their ef-
fects on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma, respectively.
It is found that although the migration cost inhibits the migration of individu-
als, it does not necessarily lead to the suppression of cooperation. We explain the
phenomenon by investigating the spatial patterns of cooperators and defectors. In-
terestingly, the curves of cooperation exhibit step structures and the corresponding
heuristic analysis is provided. Our work complements previous studies and deep-
ens the understanding regarding the success-driven migration on the evolution of
cooperation.
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1 Introduction
Cooperation is fundamental to social and biological systems. Cooperators in-
cur costs to benefit others while defectors reap the benefits but dodge the costs.
Thus, natural selection favors defectors over cooperators, although group of
cooperators perform better than groups of defectors. Yet cooperation is ubiq-
uitous in social and biological systems, and hence understanding the evolution
of cooperation becomes a challenging issue [1,2]. To explain and understand
the widely observed cooperative phenomena, evolutionary games, which pro-
vide a suitable theoretical framework, have been studied extensively by many
researches from various disciplines over the past decades [3–5]. The evolution-
ary prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) in particular, which describes the conflict
between cooperative and selfish behaviors, has attracted considerable atten-
tion in theoretical as well as experimental studies [1]. In a typical prisoner’s
dilemma [5], two individuals simultaneously decide whether to cooperate or
defect. They will receive the reward R for mutual cooperation, and the pun-
ishment P for mutual defection. For a pair of individuals adopting different
strategies, the defector gets the temptation T while the cooperator gets the
sucker’s payoff S. The ranking of the four payoffs is T > R > P > S. It
is clear that defection is always the better strategy maximizing one’s payoff,
irrespective of the opponents decision. To explain the observed widespread co-
operation, several mechanisms supporting the evolution of cooperation have
been identified (see [6] for a review).
Since the pioneering work of Nowak and May [7], spatial games have received
ample attention, and especially, evolutionary games on complex networks have
been extensively studied [8–11]. In the context of spatial games, network topol-
ogy and hierarchies have been identified as a crucial determinant for the suc-
cess of cooperative behavior [12–18], where in particular the scale-free topology
has proven very beneficial for the evolution of cooperation. The participation
cost or generally the links-related cost can, however, dismiss the advantage
of heterogeneous networks in the evolution of cooperation [19–21]. Other ap-
proaches facilitating the evolution of cooperation include the introduction of
noises to payoffs and updating rules [22–27], asymmetry between interaction
and replacement graphs [28,29], diversity [30–34], differences between time
scales of game dynamics [33,35–37], interaction stochasticity [38], as well as
the adoption of simultaneous different strategies against different opponents
[39]. Somewhat more personally-inspired features supporting the evolution of
cooperation involve memory effects [40], heterogeneous teaching activity [41–
43], preferential learning [44,45], aspiration [46–48], age [49], rationality [50],
myopically selective interactions [51,52], local contribution [53], and coevolu-
tionary partner choice [54–57], to name but a few examples studied in recent
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years.
Recently, many efforts have been directed towards the role of migration in the
emergence of cooperation, see refs. [58–69]. In particular, Helbing et al. re-
cently proposed a mechanism of so-called success-driven migration and demon-
strated that the mechanism can trigger the sudden outbreak of predominant
cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a spatial lattice
[60]. Afterwards, Yu further studied the the effect of migration on coopera-
tion by extending the interaction structure from spatial lattices to complex
networks [61]. However, the success-driven migration relies on quite extensive
information, obtaining which may require individuals to pay some costs, as
pointed out in the refs. [60,61]. For example, individuals may need to over-
come some hindrances to leave a place. Obtaining information for neighbor-
hood testings that cannot be obtained directly thought game interactions may
require individuals to pay some efforts. Moving from the original sites to the
new locations may also demand some fees. Besides, individuals may need to
pay some prices to adapt gradually to the environments in the new neigh-
borhoods, etc. However, all the costs mentioned above are largely neglected
in refs. [60,61]. How the migration cost affects the evolution of cooperation
is still unknown to us. Investigating its effect on cooperation complements
the previous studies, as well as enables us to understand the success-driven
mechanism more completely, and thus it is worth studying. Note that other
types of costs, e.g., the links-related cost or the so-called participation cost
were considered before in previous works [19–21].
In this paper, we consider the migration cost and explore its role in the success-
driven migration. Since the migration cost involves several ingredients, and
some of them are associated with the migration distance (e.g., moving to a far-
ther sites needs individuals to pay more fees), while some of them are not (e.g.,
the cost for obtaining information about the neighborhood of the new site is
independent of the distance to a large extent), there exist difficulties in deter-
mining exactly the relationship between the migration cost and the migration
distance. For the sake of completeness of this research along this line, we con-
sider both the distance-dependent cost (DDC) and distance-independent cost
(DIC) for migration. For the former, the cost increases linearly with the mi-
gration distance while in the latter case, the cost for once migration is fixed,
irrespective of the migration distance. As we will show, although the coopera-
tion levels for DDC and DIC are not identical, the overall changing tendencies
of the curves of cooperation as a function of the migration cost for the two
computational schemes are qualitatively similar.
3
2 Model
For reasons of comparison, our study is also carried out for the PDG, as in Ref.
[60]. Following common practice [7,22], we adopt the rescaled payoff matrix
of the PDG depending on one single parameter b: T = b > 1, R = 1, and
P = S = 0.
We assume N individuals locate on a square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions and of L × L sites, which are either empty or occupied by one
individual. We denote by d0 the density of population on the square lattice.
Individuals perform migration and strategy update asynchronously, in a ran-
dom sequential order. The randomly selected individual explores the expected
payoffs for the empty sites within a migration distance d, which is measured
by the number of links along the shortest path between the focal individual
and the target site. Both the distance-dependent cost (DDC) and distance-
independent cost (DIC) for migration are considered. By DDC, we mean that
the overall cost of once migration is proportional to the distance, i.e., the cost
of moving to a site with distance d is dc, c being the migration cost of unit dis-
tance. For DIC, it is assumed that the cost for once migration is c, irrespective
of the migration distance.
Before an individual migrates, it explores the expected payoffs for the empty
sites within the migration distance d. If the migration is profitable, that is, the
expected payoff minus the migration cost is higher than that in the current
location, it moves to the site with the highest net profit and, in the case of
several sites with the same net profit, to the closest one, otherwise it stays put.
After migration, the individual interacts simultaneously with all direct neigh-
bors in the von Neumann neighborhood. The overall payoff is accumulated
over all interactions with neighbors. Then, it compares the overall payoff with
that of each neighbor and copies the strategy of the best performing neighbor
with certainty, if its own payoff is lower.
Simulations of this PDG model are performed by means of an asynchronous
updating rule, using L = 50 system size. Initially, an equal percentage of co-
operators and defectors are homogeneously distributed over the whole square
lattice. The key quantity for characterizing the cooperative behavior of the
system is the density of cooperators, which is defined as the fraction of coop-
erators in the whole population. In all the simulations, the maximummigration
distance is d = 5.
4
3 Results
Let us first investigate how the migration cost affects individual migration
behavior. The results are shown in Fig. 1. One can find that the rates of
migration decrease as t increases, irrespective of the value of c, indicating that
as the system evolves, less and less individuals engage in migration. For c = 0,
the percentage of the migrant individuals here is about 0.3%, while for c > 0,
it is zero, that is, the final state for c > 0 is frozen. By comparing the results
for different values of c, one can find that the migration is indeed inhibited
by the migration cost, since the decline of the curves for larger value of c is
even faster. Moreover, the inhibitive effect is stronger for DDC than DIC, as
indicated by the results for c = 1.0.
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Fig. 1. Time courses depicting the rate of migration of individuals for (a) DDC and
(b) DIC. The population density is d0 = 0.4. The rate of migration is obtained by
calculating the fraction of migrant individuals in the entire population. The results
are obtained by averaging over 100 realizations.
We next investigate how the migration cost affects the evolution of coopera-
tion. Figure 2 illustrates the density of cooperators ρc as a function the mi-
gration cost c. One can find that DDC and DIC lead to different cooperation
levels, except when the migration cost c is sufficiently large. The difference of
the resulting cooperation levels tends to decrease as d0 increases. Despite of
the difference, there exist similarities between the results for DDC and DIC.
First, the overall changing tendencies of the cooperation level with increasing
c are similar, which reveals that there is actually no essential difference in the
effects of DDC and DIC on cooperation. Second, both of the cooperation levels
display step structures when c is an integer, and the step structures become
more regular for large values of d0 (the reason will be given below). Third,
for both DDC and DIC, the minimum cooperation level occurs at intermedi-
ate values of c, although for large values of d0, this becomes less pronounced.
Moreover, for small values of b, the sufficiently large value of c proves to be
favorable to cooperation as compared with c = 0 when d0 is small. As d0 in-
creases, ρC tends to descend monotonously with c, indicating that the larger
the values of the migration cost, the more unfavorable cooperation becomes.
While for large values of b, sufficiently large c can almost always facilitate
the emergence of cooperation as compared to c = 0. The promotive effect on
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Fig. 2. Cooperator density ρC in dependence on the migration cost c for different
values of the population density d0: (a) d0 = 0.1, (b) d0 = 0.4, (c) d0 = 0.8. The
quantity ρC is obtained by averaging over 200 different realizations, and for each
realization, we average over 200 time steps after 1000 time steps.
cooperation becomes, however, less pronounced for higher densities of popu-
lation. In addition, for each value of d0, there exists a critical value of ccrit
(e.g., ccrit = 1.0 for d0 = 0.1 and b = 1.2), and when c < ccrit, DIC leads to
a higher density of cooperation than DDC while when c > ccrit, the opposite
result occurs. Note also that ρc corresponding to c = 0.0 for d0 = 0.4 is higher
than those for d0 = 0.1, which is consistent with the results shown in Fig. 2 of
Ref. [65], where one can find that ρc is maximized for moderate values of d0.
Figure 3 shows ρc as a function of b. Since for c = 0 and c → ∞, the calcu-
lation scheme of the migration cost becomes irrelevant, we, therefore, do not
distinguish DDC from DIC. On the other hand, since cooperation is almost a
monotonically decreasing function of c for d0 = 0.8, we show only the results
corresponding to c = 0 and c→∞. One can observe that the levels of cooper-
ation decrease monotonically with increasing b, irrespective of the values of d0
and c. This is because increasing b makes defection more tempted. Let us now
look at the results for c = 0 and c → ∞. It can be observed that a crossover
occurs between them (when d0 is large, e.g, d0 = 0.8, the crossover becomes
ambiguous), and before the crossover, c = 0 leads to a higher cooperation level
than c → ∞, while after the crossover, the opposite results occur. This sug-
gests that when the temptation to defect is small, migration without any cost
is favorable to cooperation, whereas when the temptation to defect is large,
constraining individuals to the original locations is favorable to cooperation
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Fig. 3. Cooperator density ρC in dependence on the temptation to defect b for
different values of the migration cost c under different population densities d0: (a)
d0 = 0.1, (b) d0 = 0.4, (c) d0 = 0.8. The quantity ρC is obtained in the same way
as in Fig. 2.
instead. This reveals that the success-driven migration does not always favor
cooperation, and no migration may be helpful to cooperation (especially for
large values of b), which is interesting and nonintuitive. Apart from this, we
also show the results for c at which the lowest cooperation levels occur, which
are consistent with those reported in Fig. 2.
To explain the obtained results, we investigate the spatial patterns of cooper-
ators and defectors in the stationary state, as shown in Fig. 4. One can find
that for c = 0, cooperators cluster together and defectors primarily locate at
the boundaries. Whereas for c → ∞, since the movement of individuals is
completely suppressed, cooperators and defectors can only distribute isolat-
edly when the population density is very low, and even if for higher densities
of population, only small clusters can be formed. For intermediate values of c,
the cooperator clusters are smaller than those for c = 0 but larger than those
for c → ∞, and there exist a large number of defectors scattering randomly
over the square lattices and being separated from cooperative clusters. Note-
worthy, the patterns in panels (e) and (h) are similar to those shown in panels
(c) and (a) of Ref. [60], respectively.
We next discuss the formation mechanisms of the patterns shown in Fig. 4.
When c = 0, individuals can migrate freely without any cost. At this moment,
due to the mechanism of the success-driven migration, defectors are attracted
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Fig. 4. Snapshots of representative stationary distributions of cooperators and de-
fectors: (a) d0 = 0.1, c = 0, (b) DDC, d0 = 0.1, c = 0.55, (c) DIC, d0 = 0.1, c = 1.05,
(d) d0 = 0.1, c → ∞, (e) d0 = 0.4, c = 0, (f) DDC, d0 = 0.4, c = 0.5, (g) DIC,
d0 = 0.4, c = 1.5, (h) d0 = 0.4, c → ∞, (i)d0 = 0.8, c = 0, (j) DDC, d0 = 0.8,
c = 1.5, (k) DIC, d0 = 0.8, c = 1.5, and (l) d0 = 0.8, c → ∞. Cooperators are
depicted in blue and defectors in red and the results are obtained for b = 1.2.
to cooperator clusters and then being turned into cooperators. Thus the clus-
ters expand in size gradually. Because defectors inside cooperator clusters can
trigger the splitting of cooperative clusters, defectors in the stationary state
can only locate at the boundary. In contrast, when c→∞, individuals’ move-
ment is completely inhibited and no individuals engage in migration. Hence
the initial random distribution is maintained and the result of the imitation-
only case with no noise is reproduced (see Fig. 1(a) of Ref. [60]).
In Fig. 2, the lowest cooperation level occurs at intermediate values of c (espe-
cially when the population density is low), which can be explained by inspect-
ing the patterns shown in Fig. 4. When there is no migration cost, cooperators
can assist each other by forming cooperator clusters by which cooperators can
be favored. When c→∞, the strong inhibition to the movement of defectors
makes defectors have no chance to invade cooperators such that cooperators
can have the chance to survive. The lower the population density, the more
apparent the above effect becomes. When d0 is small, since the vast majority
of individuals are isolated such that defectors have no chance to contact coop-
erators. Therefore, cooperators can evade defectors (see Fig. 4(d)). However,
as d0 increases, individuals increasingly connect with each other, and hence,
even if the movement is inhibited, defectors can also exploit their cooperative
neighbors and then invade them. By this means, defectors can expand their
territory and eventually dominate the population, as shown in Figs. 4(h) and
(l). This is why with increasing d0, the effect of c on cooperation turns from
promotive to inhibitive. For small intermediate values of c, all individuals can
still move to a certain extent. The movement, however, is not sufficiently free
such that cooperators can form compact clusters, as in pattern Fig. 4(a), but
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it is also sufficient for defectors to invade cooperators in their neighborhoods.
Consequently, one can find that only fortunate cooperators can survive.
We now analyze the difference between DDC and DIC as well as the results
obtained with them, as shown in Fig. 2. One can find that for both b = 1.2 and
b = 1.6, DDC results in a lower cooperation level than DIC at small values of
c, which can be explained as follows. For small c, cooperation can generally
be inhibited. For the same value of c, DDC leads to large migration cost since
migrating to farther sites need individuals to pay more price. Accordingly,
DDC can be more detrimental to cooperation than DIC. While as c increases,
large migration cost is helpful to cooperation such that DDC instead leads to
a higher cooperation level, as shown in Fig. 2(a).
One can observe the occurrence of step structures of the curves at c = 1.0,2.0,3.0,
as illustrated in Fig. 2. Here, we give a simple heuristic analysis for the point at
which the cooperation level increases or decreases sharply. Note that individ-
uals engaging in migration are nothing more than cooperators and defectors.
For cooperators, all the possible payoffs are 0, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0. For cooper-
ators to migrate, the payoff difference between those for the targeted location
and the current site needs to be larger than a certain value. Therefore, the
quantity mattered currently is the payoff difference. Because of the discrete-
ness of individuals’ payoffs on a square lattice, the possible payoff differences
are 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0. When c is larger than a critical point, the migration of
cooperators with the payoff difference equal to c is hampered such that sudden
change of ρC can occur. These critical points may include 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0.
Note that, the payoff difference 4.0 means an isolated cooperator migrates to
an empty site surrounded by four cooperators, which is actually a rare case.
Hence, the abrupt change of ρC at c = 4 can only be vaguely observed for high
densities of population, e.g., d0 = 0.8. Similarly, for defectors, all the possible
payoffs are 0.4, 0.3+ b, 0.2+2b, 0.1+3b and 4b. All the possible payoff differ-
ences are b−0.1, 2(b−0.1), 3(b−0.1) and 4(b−0.1). In consequence, the only
point where the sudden change can occur is b − 0.1. For b = 1.2 and b = 1.6
they are c = 1.1 and c = 1.5, respectively. Sudden changes at c = 1.1 and
c = 1.5, however, are not observed, indicating that the migration of defectors
has little effect on the evolution of cooperation. One the other hand, although
the overall trend is that sudden changes occur at the predicted points, the
changes are not identically apparent which is due to the different densities of
population.
To further probe the effect of the migration cost on the evolution of cooper-
ation, we investigate the time evolution of the spatial patterns, as shown in
Fig. 5. One can find that overall, cooperator clusters in the absence of the mi-
gration cost [see the blue and green areas in panels (a), (b) and (c)] are larger
than those in the presence of it [panels (d), (e) and (f)]. By comparing results
illustrated in panels (a) and (d), where the strategy changes of individuals
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Fig. 5. Time evolution of the snapshots of representative distributions of cooperators
and defectors obtained with DDC (red, defector; blue, cooperator; white, empty site;
green, defector who became a cooperator in the last iteration; yellow, cooperator
who turned into a defector). (a) c = 0, t = 1, ρc = 0.448, (b) c = 0, t = 3, ρc = 0.647,
(c) c = 0, t = 100, ρc = 0.836, (d) c = 0.5, t = 1, ρc = 0.357, (e) c = 0.5, t = 3,
ρc = 0.33, (f) c = 0.5, t = 100, ρc = 0.416. We have checked that at t = 13, for both
c = 0 and c = 0.5, the system has reached the equilibrium. The results are obtained
for d0 = 0.4 and b = 1.2.
from t = 0 to t = 1 are shown for c = 0 and c = 0.5, respectively, one can find
that when the migration cost arises, cooperators have a lower opportunity to
come together, as indicated by the fact that the cooperator clusters in panel
(a) are larger than those in panel (d). This is apparently caused by the migra-
tion cost, that is, due to the inhibition to migration by the cost, cooperators’
movement is suppressed to a certain extent such that the chance for them to
form clusters decreases. Actually, the initially established cooperator clusters
are crucial since initially many individuals change their strategy frequently
[see the green and yellow areas in panels (b) and (e)] and they can attract
defectors and then turn them into cooperators [see the green areas in panels
(b) and (e) indicating that boundary defectors can be frequently turned into
cooperators]. It can also be observed by comparing panels (b), (c) and (e), (f),
respectively, that because of the migration cost to individuals’ movement, a
large number of isolatedly distributed defectors have no chance to join in the
groups of cooperators and thus have no chance to become cooperators. Note
also that no strategy changes of individuals in the stationary state occur since
here we incorporate no noises into our model (for the definition of the noises,
see Ref.[60]).
Note that we can also explain the results reported above from the perspective
of strategy communication among individuals, as in Ref. [65]. When c = 0,
individuals can move within a wider range such that individuals can contact
more individuals. That is, individuals can perform strategy communication
within a wider range, and the communication successfully leads to the change
of defectors into cooperators, and hence the promotion of cooperation. When
the migration cost is considered, such strategy communication is, however,
inhibited, which leads to the separation of cooperators from defectors and
10
eventually the inhibition to cooperation.
4 Discussion and conclusion
In summary, we have systemically investigated the effect of the migration cost
on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game under differ-
ent population densities. We have considered both the distance-dependent and
distance-independent costs and shown that the influences of the two calcula-
tion schemes of the migration cost on cooperation are qualitatively similar,
although there exist differences in the resulting cooperation levels for small
values of the migration cost. It is found that although the migration cost in-
hibits the migration of individuals, it does not always lead to the suppression
to cooperation (especially when the migration is large enough). Actually, the
lowest cooperation levels occur at intermediate values of the migration cost,
and large values of the migration cost can facilitate the evolution of cooper-
ation, although this effect becomes weaker as the density of population in-
creases. Interestingly, the curves of cooperation as a function of the migration
cost display step structures, which has been explained by the configurational
analysis. We have also investigated spatial patterns for typical parameters for
intuitively understanding the obtained results.
Note that since our primary aim is to uncover the effect of the migration
cost on the outbreak of cooperation rather than the effect of noises in the
evolutionary process, we concentrate on the the noiseless case (see Ref.[60] for
the definition of the noises). Despite this, we have also checked that when
noises are involved, the results are qualitatively the same. Note also that
here the maximum migration distance is set to d = 5. We have checked that
increasing or shortening the maximum migration distance in an appropriate
range does not qualitatively alter the results. In addition, currently the games
is occurring on the square lattice with von Neuman neighborhood, We have
also investigated the game on a square lattice with Moore neighborhood and
found that the results are qualitatively unchanged.
The result that the success-driven migration leads to the outbreak of cooper-
ation in the prisoner’s dilemma game in Ref.[60] is no doubt quite significant,
considering that migration is a key feature in real ecosystems and human soci-
eties. However, it may require individuals to pay some cost to implement the
success-driven migration. Ignoring such cost may lead to deficiencies in the
obtained results. Here we investigate how the migration cost affects the out-
break of cooperation, which complements the original study. Our model may
be more realistic and the obtained results may be more significative in under-
standing the role of success-driven migration in the outbreak of cooperation
in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Our results may have potential implications
11
in the design of coordination and cooperation mechanism in the multi-agent
systems.
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